Euroscepticism - Part 4

I have mentioned in part 3 that what is lacking for further integration of Europe could be because of the idea that the EU cannot compensate for the inadequacies of national democracies. Also, I added that Eurosceptic resistance is voiced in response to both the current European integration process and the pro-European arguments used by political actors to legitimize it, particularly member state governments and supranational institutions. Yet,

24. There are several other perspectives related to the roots of the rise of Euroscepticism in addition to the economic and political party aspects. And they all can be examined as below. First, Leonard Ray proves that Euroscepticism is essentially a political fringe phenomenon. The issue is ideological extremism: radical left parties oppose European integration because they see it as a capitalist endeavor, while radical right parties oppose it because they want to protect national sovereignty. Eurosceptic mainstream parties exist (mostly in Scandinavia and the United Kingdom), and as Ray points out, these parties are defined by their strong defense of national interests.

25. Second, Lauren McLaren emphasizes economic, cultural, and institutional variables in public support for EU policy in the early 2000s. Her findings support the theory that Euroscepticism is motivated by exclusive national identities. However, she discovers that those who feel personally disadvantaged by European integration, as well as those who distrust EU institutions, are more likely to be Eurosceptics. As a result, there may be two independent paths to Euroscepticism: one based on a perceived cultural threat, and the other on a perceived economic loss as it is mentioned above. Euroscepticism is also motivated by institutional distrust, according to McLaren.

26. Third, Andre Krouwel and Koen Abts also note that opposition to European integration is rooted in larger political discontent, emphasizing the role of populists in connecting domestic and European unhappiness. Because most voters have no strong feelings for Europe, populists can use it to transfer their dissatisfaction with home elites or institutions onto Europe. Furthermore, populist language can foster a downward spiral of dissatisfaction by framing specific concerns in terms of a broader system collapse, disarming voters' ability to discriminate and critically reflect.

27. Fourth, Claes de Vreese investigates how newspaper coverage of EU summits in the Netherlands and Denmark influences public opinion on European integration. The paper by De Vreese elucidates both the promise and limitations of media framing. He disproves the idea that the media constantly amplifies political skepticism. This is dependent on the news reports themselves, as well as whether the general populace is prone to political cynicism. Cynicism is more prevalent when the media focuses on candidate style and simplistic public opinion polls rather than the substance of policy. Politics is shown as a kind of war game that may be won or lost in this mode.

28. Fifth, citizens' Euroscepticism, according to Catherine de Vries and Kees van Kersbergen's paper, is a reaction to national government failure. Citizens give their governments their support in exchange for cultural security and economic prosperity. Citizens extend allegiance from their own state to the EU as long as EU membership is compatible with national governments' ability to deliver. Citizens, on the other hand, reject this dual allegiance when governments fail to safeguard them from insecurity. As a result, Euroscepticism is the price the EU pays when countries fail to live up to their obligations.

29. Last but not least, Liesbet Hooghe, JingJing Huo, and Gary Marks look at how occupational location and civic vs ethnic identification affect Euroscepticism. They discovered that occupation and identity have similar-sized independent impacts. In countries with strong radical right parties, identity is a big concern. They come to the conclusion that the poor dependability of available survey data makes evaluating viable rival theories difficult.

30. So we can say that when all arguments are analyzed the common thing of all of them is that Euroscepticism arises from the interaction of identity and economic interest and even though several forms of Euroscepticism coexist in Europe, they all emphasize the desire to retain national or regional identity while questioning the merits of being a member of the EU or a part of the EU area.

References and for further readings you can check:

Durand, F., Decoville, A., & Knippschild, R. (2017). Everything All Right at the Internal EU Borders? The Ambivalent Effects of Cross-Border Integration and the Rise of Euroscepticism. Geopolitics, 25(3), 587-608. doi: 10.1080/14650045.2017.1382475

Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2007). Sources of Euroscepticism. Acta Politica, 42(2-3), 119-127. doi: 10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500192

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