Euroscepticism - Part 2

In part 2 of this series, we continue to look into the reasons why the eurosceptic parties are on the rise.

After looking into some terminology and the historical development of Euroscepticism, I was talking about the main reasons for it in part 1. Lastly, I mentioned how the EU resembles the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Latin America to an increasing number of individuals in southern European countries. 


8. Meanwhile, the EU is widely perceived among northern European countries as having failed to manage the southern rim's policies. The creditors share the same sense of victimhood as the debtors. Few people in the north or south today believe they are sovereign, if sovereignty is defined as the ability of the people to decide what they want for their country. At the national level, a significant portion of democracy has vanished, but it has not been replaced at the European level.


9. Hence, Euroscepticism's prevalence and characteristics vary across Europe, but it's causality appears to be predictable. It is discovered that Euroscepticism has evolved in lockstep with the EU's policies. It was born out of opposition to market integration in the early decades of European integration, yet it has taken on a new dimension since the Maastricht Treaty: defense of national community.


10. That is why, to begin with, it can be said that economic interest and identity can be examined as sources of Euroscepticism among European individuals. And it can be further understood by saying that media and political parties influence public opinion resulting in a more negative attitude amongst societies.


11. Since the early 1990s, the jump into political union and the associated public support of the EU's basic legitimacy has marked a significant shift from previous decades. European individuals have been more engaged in issues of European integration, which are increasingly seen as being of "general interest".


12. The starting point here is the common realization that insulated elites no longer determine European integration. Public opinion, party competition, and the mass media are all important components.


13. This citizen participation takes place in a variety of ways outside of these formal “constitutional moments”, including the greater use of popular referenda to decide on membership and treaty amendment. It has seen that citizens have frequently hindered further integration by voting down treaty modifications and membership questions in referendums. Rather than a "permissive consensus" on the benefits of continued integration, Europe's political atmosphere has increasingly shifted to a "constraining dissensus".


14. Another increasing effect was the slogans such as "Against EU-dictatorship" or "Against the Treaty of Dishonor'' which have been reissued in daily news coverage of the Eurocrisis, which has shaken the EU to its core. Concerns about technocratic governance, the excess of executive power, or the primacy of the economic over the political are linked in daily media debates to more fundamental questions about the mandate of the European Central Bank and other supranational institutions, the continued membership of certain countries, or even the dangers of the EU collapsing.


15. According to Lauren McLaren, "the European integration project may introduce numerous opportunities to draw on one's skills and finances for some Europeans, particularly the elites of society." However, considering the specific benefits, or costs, of integration is likely to be difficult for the great majority of Europeans, as “non-elite groups do indeed fail to detect any personal benefits or costs of integrating Europe”.


References and for further readings you can check:
de Wilde, P., & Trenz, H. (2012). Denouncing European integration. European Journal Of Social Theory, 15(4), 537-554. doi: 10.1177/1368431011432968
Durand, F., Decoville, A., & Knippschild, R. (2017). Everything All Right at the Internal EU Borders? The Ambivalent Effects of Cross-Border Integration and the Rise of Euroscepticism. Geopolitics, 25(3), 587-608. doi: 10.1080/14650045.2017.1382475
Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2007). Sources of Euroscepticism. Acta Politica, 42(2-3), 119-127. doi: 10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500192
Torreblanca, J., & Leonard, M. (2013). THE CONTINENT WIDE RISE OF EUROSCEPTICISM [Ebook] (pp. 1-2). European Council on Foreign Relations.
For Photos: 1 / 2