Euroscepticism - Part 3

Reflecting society’s concerns regarding the European integration and how negative attitudes spread amongst them, I lastly emphasized in part 2 that considering the specific benefits, or costs, of integration, it is likely to be difficult for the great majority of Europeans, as “non-elite groups do indeed fail to detect any personal benefits or costs of integrating Europe” 

16. For example, the settlement of cross-border workers in regions located across the border from major metropolitan areas, who often have more purchasing power than “local” residents, leads to an increase in land and property prices, resulting in negative social externalities for domestic residents. The latter may believe that they are less privileged and that they suffer more than they receive from the process of cross-border integration.

17. These people call into question the way the European system is set up. The high ratings achieved by nationalist or sovereignist parties in several European border regions, which advocate Eurosceptic ideas, tend to demonstrate that a portion of the people living in border regions lack trust and support for EU institutions and policies.

18. According to the utilitarian argument, people evaluate the benefits of Europeanization through a cost-benefit analysis. If cross-border integration improves the quality of life of residents in border regions, or if it expands their employment or consumption opportunities, residents in border regions are likely to be less Eurosceptic than residents in central regions. However, this could also be used in the opposite direction. Indeed, Euroscepticism may rise if the benefits of cross-border integration are associated with a fear of being subjected to additional constraints, competition, annoyances, or insecurity. In that instance, the perceived costs can outweigh the “added benefit” of cross-border integration in communal representations.

19. Parallel to this, “In addition to distinctions between rich and poor, religious and secular, a gap has emerged between the highly educated, embracing individualistic and cosmopolitan values, and profiting from open borders on the one hand, and the less educated, more nationalist, community-oriented, and nostalgic, who all feel threatened by globalization and immigration on the other hand.” wrote J. De Voogd.

20. Moreover, it is argued that political parties would be able to speak these varied ideas in a fully functioning national political system, and ideally act as a referee and establish common ground amongst them. But it is precisely what the European political system cannot provide: the EU cannot compensate for the inadequacies of national democracies because it lacks actual political parties, a proper administration, and a public sphere. Instead of a debate over ideas, the EU has become engulfed in a vicious spiral of anti-EU populism and technocratic agreements among member states fearful of their citizens.

21. Identity and economic interests, which are the two major problematic notions behind the rise of Euroscepticism as mentioned before, do not speak for themselves; they are shaped and cured by political actors. Euroscepticism is the product of political actors' attempts to link European integration to widespread public fears of cultural and economic loss. To comprehend differences in European perspectives, one must attempt to explain how Europe is constituted through political discourse. As a result, we must pay close attention to the efforts of far-right political parties, populist business people, and the media to stoking Euroscepticism.

22. Accordingly, it can be said that understanding Euroscepticism as a form of polity contestation could be a first step towards emphasizing the EU opposition's responsiveness to ongoing attempts to promote the EU's legitimacy. In many circumstances, Euroscepticism is responsive rather than singular, isolated, and unusual. Eurosceptic resistance is voiced in response to both the current European integration process and the pro-European arguments used by political actors to legitimize it, particularly member state governments and supranational institutions.

23. However, it must be acknowledged that isolating the weight of Eurosceptic discourse in the rationale that drives individuals to vote for these parties is difficult.

References and for further readings you can check:

de Wilde, P., & Trenz, H. (2012). Denouncing European integration. European Journal Of Social Theory, 15(4), 537-554. doi: 10.1177/1368431011432968

Durand, F., Decoville, A., & Knippschild, R. (2017). Everything All Right at the Internal EU Borders? The Ambivalent Effects of Cross-Border Integration and the Rise of Euroscepticism. Geopolitics, 25(3), 587-608. doi: 10.1080/14650045.2017.1382475

Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2007). Sources of Euroscepticism. Acta Politica, 42(2-3), 119-127. doi: 10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500192

Torreblanca, J., & Leonard, M. (2013). THE CONTINENT WIDE RISE OF EUROSCEPTICISM [Ebook] (pp. 1-2). European Council on Foreign Relations.

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