Legal Approaches to Non-Human Animals 

Aristotle famously remarked that "man is by nature a political animal," implying that humans have rationale and moral reasoning, enabling them to intervene in the realms of politics and social relations. This could be a great starting point for understanding that humans are animals, but they differ from non-human animals in a variety of ways. One of which is the most troublesome and has even given the animal rights movement its name: the field of rights. 

Following Aristotle's definition, we deduce that animals are ineligible for political rights or inclusion in that realm. Non-human animals, however, continue to hold a significant place in our human-made laws although they do not actively participate in political decision-making processes as like voting. Individual acts of cruelty to animals, for example, are subject to punishment under many national and international law. However, as animal rights lawyers have pointed out, this is largely due to the classification of non-human animals as "things" under the legislation. This is very critical in understanding their legal treatment and rights. 

Our current laws are built on the premise belief that humans are the only species worthy of legal respect. This implies that they are speciesist and anthropocentric. It is speciesist in the sense that it disregards the fact that humans and non-human animals are both animals with some main distinctions. Furthermore, it derives its anthropocentric fashion from primarily securing human interests, particularly the cruel classification of them as "things" in the legal provisions. This situation reveals that even anti-cruelty laws, which appear to be a triumph of animal rights activism, lack moral understanding and are far from ensuring equal consideration. Our laws are, without a doubt, created by humans and serve primarily to protect human interests. However, this anthropocentric understanding should not obscure the idea that, regardless of differences, sentient beings, whether human or nonhuman, deserve moral consideration and, at the very least, some legal rights. 

In making this claim, it is also important to note that equal rights do not necessarily imply having the same rights as non-human animals, such as the right to vote. It would be equally anthropocentric to believe that non-human animals are interested in participating in our human- made laws and governments; however, this should not prevent us from critically examining national and international laws and from ensuring their welfare and protecting their interests, regardless of how much they differ from human animals' interests. 

As a result, acknowledging that human and non-human animals are very alike; differing qualities, interests, and even ways of suffering cannot be invoked as a basis for inadequate rights granted and protected by law for both human and non-human animals. Our current laws, even anti-cruelty laws, which seem to be an accomplishment of animal rights activism at first glance, lack a moral understanding and are both speciesist and anthropocentric in that they are based on humans' use of animals. A companion animal of a single legal person does not raise the same legal repercussions as a street animal. An injury to a companion animal is considered a harm to a human-owner, whereas a harm to a waif animal is not recognized in the same way by the law. This speciesism may be difficult to spot at first moment at the criminal law codes, but as it is discovered, there is no justification for continuing this approach in our laws. That will also be the reason for a change in our laws to be more ethical, considerate, and benevolent, and it will be a task for everyone, including ordinary citizens who do not actively participate in the legislative processes.