Was the Ottoman-Safavid Rivalry a Political or Religious Matter?

From the start, the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry was more than just a sectarian conflict. Although there were undoubtedly religious differences between the two empires, political and territorial ambitions were what ultimately led to war. While the Ottomans aimed to keep their hold on the region's power, the Safavids wanted to enlarge their empire into Ottoman lands. But as hostilities intensified, religious divisions grew more pronounced and sectarianism became a more important factor in the conflict. We can see the agency of this outcome in the letters written by the two rulers to each other, with the validity of religious references in the Ottoman-Safavid political struggles.

The correspondence between the two emperors sheds light on the complicated relationship that existed between the Ottoman and Safavid empires. On the one hand, there is a shared desire for peace and a language of Islamic brotherhood. Both emperors express their desire for a peaceful conclusion to the conflicts between their empires and identify themselves as Allah's servants. There is, however, also a noticeable sense of rivalry and hostility. Ismail's letter can be interpreted as an effort to placate the Ottoman emperor and prevent conflict because Selim I describes the Safavid Empire as a threat.

The letter also shows the importance of religion in the politics of the time. Both rulers referred to Islamic principles and teachings in their letters, and their words reflected deep religious beliefs. For Ismail, his identity as a Shiite Muslim is central to his self-description, and he describes his followers as "true followers of Ali". It emphasizes its commitment to Islam and sees the Ottoman Empire as the defender of the faith.

Derin Terzioğlu, in her article, How to Conceptualize Ottoman Sunnitization, talks about Suleyman's imperial decree in 1537 ordering the construction of mosques for each and every village under his realm. Such an attempt to pressure the local populace to attend religious practices articulated devices and symbols of political authority. As Terzioğlu mentioned, the catechism (ilmihal) books written in this period are also books that focus more on how to believe and not to believe, and their number is high. This activity gives important ideas about the confessionalization polity of the Ottomans. In addition, the increase in the effectiveness of the centrally appointed preachers during this period is an important part of this process.

On the other hand, Terzioğlu argues that since the middle of the 17th century, the Ottoman policy of Sunnization gained a new phase. According to her, this new phase is a phase in which the Ottoman Empire did not directly target its Alevi population and did not make accusations of their deviance, but where "confessionalization from below" continued in a sociocultural context.

At a time when the Ottomans were faced with the Safavid danger for the first time and this brought with it an identity problem, they excluded the Alevi-Kizilbash identity and implemented a harsh policy of Sunniization, but with the disappearance of the danger of Anatolia's entry into the Safavid influence, a softer policy was followed by the sectarian sectarianism of the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry. Such a change of policy can show us that the main base of the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry was completely political. 

[1]: Derin Terzioğlu, "How to Conceptualize Ottoman Sunnitization: A Historiographical Discussion," Turcica 44 (2012-3), 301-338